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However, at the beginning of this decade the prospects for the MFTZ becoming reality are unclear. With the European Union (EU) deeply involved in and occupied with enlargement, particularly towards Central and Eastern European countries, and struggling to come to terms with the necessary institutional reforms to accommodate many more members, it does not seem out of the question that the MFTZ will never materialise. At the least, it seems fair to say that the MFTZ is far from being a top priority concern for the EU. On the other hand, the date 2010 is still far away and in politics deadlines matter a lot, but only if they come close enough to enter the rather short-sighted perspectives of policy makers. In other words, it is far too early to write off the MFTZ and this would remain true even if no substantial steps towards such a free trade zone were undertaken within the next five years or so.
Even if the eventual establishing of the MFTZ by 2010 could be taken as a matter of fact, it is far from clear, however, what it would look like. If the few bilateral EuroMediterranean Association Agreements, which have so far been signed and ratified and which are to form the basis for the MFTZ to build upon, were to provide the 4 blueprint for such a regional free trade agreement (FTA), then it will have three major characteristics:
* it would not be a comprehensive agreement as concerns binding provisions. The gradual abolition of tariffs on EU industrial exports and the opening of Mediterranean countries towards foreign investment by EU investors would form its only major objectives. Trade liberalisation in agricultural products would remain very limited, much to the frustration of Southern Mediterranean countries.
* it would cover a comprehensive list of aspects of economic, financial, social, environmental and cultural cooperation. However, cooperation would be based on mostly non-binding, general promises.
* it would have a rather rudimentary institutional structure only.
If, on the other hand, the only currently existing regional FTA to speak of between developed countries and a developing country -namely the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) -is of any guidance on how the MFTZ could eventually look like, then there will be many more detailed and comprehensive rules on, for example, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures as well as technical barriers to trade and there will be a stronger institutional structure dealing with, amongst other things, environmental matters.
This article focuses on environmental aspects of the proposed MFTZ in the context of a wider European regional environmental strategy. It assesses the existing bilateral association agreements from an environmental perspective and highlights their deficiencies. Modern agreements have so far been negotiated with Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and the Palestinian Authority and they hardly differ from 5 country to country.
1 The article demonstrates how the MFTZ could become an environmentally friendly regional FTA that could serve as a model for similar undertakings elsewhere and how it could form the heart of an ambitious regional environmental strategy. is not ensured that the MFTZ will become an environmentally friendly FTA, then the increase in economic growth following from trade liberalisation will likely worsen the situation with respect to, for example, scarcity of water resources, soil erosion, pressure on coastal areas, the marine environment and the urban infrastructure as well as air and water pollution. Water scarcity in particular represents a problem. If it is not comprehensively addressed it will become a drag on agricultural productivity and economic development more generally and will remain a security problem destabilising the whole region.
THE IMPORTANCE OF AN ENVIRONMENTALLY FRIENDLY MFTZ
A properly designed MFTZ could do more than mitigate negative environmental impacts, however. Meaningful regional environmental cooperation would open the prospect for positively improving environmental conditions in the whole area. In a more long-term and visionary perspective, the MFTZ could form the basis for a renewable energy partnership, where Southern Mediterranean countries use their solar potential to replace their own fossil fuel dependency, but more importantly that of the EU member countries as well (Brauch 1996; Rhein 1997) .
PREAMBULAR LANGUAGE
Every FTA starts with a preamble, which lays down its objectives and guiding principles. Astonishingly, there is typically no environmentally friendly preambular language in the Euro-Mediterranean association agreements as there is, for example, Neither the wording of these two clauses, nor their location within and restricted to the section of economic cooperation is satisfactory. Instead, the MFTZ should additionally contain environmentally friendly language in its preamble, embracing sustainable development and the achievement of a high level of environmental protection as objectives combined with progressive environmental improvements as a guiding target. NAFTA's reference to a strengthening of the development and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations is also laudable and should be 8 followed in the MFTZ, as the non-enforcement of laws and regulations is responsible for a great many environmental problems, even within the EU (see Macrory (1992) and Somsen (1996) ).
POTENTIAL HARMONISATION AND THE LEVEL OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
As mentioned above, it is not entirely clear how far reaching the MFTZ will become. 
THE WORDING OF THE GENERAL EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE
The association agreements contain a general exceptions clause stating that the agreement 'shall not preclude prohibitions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of (…) the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants' (Art. 28 of the agreement with Morocco, identical wording in other agreements). This safeguard is, however, subject to the requirement that 'such prohibitions or restrictions shall not (…) constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between the Parties' (ibid. 
THE ROLE OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
Scientific uncertainty poses a great problem for environmental protection measures.
Uncertainty refers to a situation where the probability distribution over a set of possible states of the world and the resulting consequences cannot be known objectively (cf. Neumayer 1999, pp. 99-101) . Because they cannot be known objectively, there cannot be definite scientific evidence. In these cases scientists can merely provide best guesses based on judgements -sophisticated and informed judgements, but guesses nevertheless. Scientists themselves will differ in cases of scientific uncertainty, and sometimes quite dramatically so, with respect to an assessment of the dangers posed by uncertainties.
Unfortunately, uncertainties do not merely exist on the fringe. Instead they are a central characteristic of modern life. Be it the potential danger that 'mad cow disease'
(BSE) poses to human beings as well, or the potential health dangers from beef stemming from cattle raised with growth hormones, or the dangers from genetically modified organisms (GMOs) -the central characteristic of these and other cases is the uncertainty of the danger posed. There is no scientific consensus on either the likelihood of the dangers occurring or the severity of the consequences should they occur. In order to deal with scientific uncertainty, policy makers may take recourse to the so-called precautionary principle. It says that preventive measures to avoid environmental harm should (or at least can) be undertaken before there is definite scientific evidence proving that certain activities cause environmental harm.
Neither NAFTA, nor the WTO agreements have fully integrated the precautionary principle. The SPS Agreement, for example, allows preventive action only provisionally until a 'more objective (sic!) assessment of risk' (Art. 5:7) is provided.
Not surprisingly then, a WTO panel and appellate body have ruled against an European Communities (EC) import ban on beef from cattle raised with growth hormones, which is based on a precautionary approach given the difficulties in providing an "objective" assessment of risk for growth hormones (WTO 1998).
The Treaty establishing the EU is more advanced than the WTO's SPS Agreement or NAFTA in explicitly embracing the precautionary principle. Nominally, it can only be found at one point, namely in its Environment Chapter in Art. 174:2, which states that Community policy on the environment 'shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken…'. The
Commission itself insists, however, that the principle and its application must not be Experience with oil extraction in Nigeria and mining in Indonesia and Papua New
Guinea shows that at times MNCs operate business with significantly negative environmental impacts either because environmental standards in those countries are low or because they are not enforced (Mabey and McNally 1999) . Environmentalists sometimes suggest that this can be avoided in requiring MNCs to apply the environmental standards of their home countries in the country of their investment (FoEME 2000, p. 22). While doing so is in principle possible, at least according to one legal doctrine, it would cause considerable difficulties in practice as it would extend the scope of domestic legislation beyond the territory of the home country and thereby override the legislative powers of the host country (Muchlinski 1995, pp. 123f.). Inevitably, this would be regarded by host countries as 'eco-imperialism'. The only way around this would therefore be to ensure that environmentally unfriendly operations by MNCs receive significant media attention and to put sufficient pressure on them to voluntarily refrain from such operations.
A MEA SAVINGS CLAUSE?
NAFTA was the first regional FTA to contain a savings clause for multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Art. 104 explicitly states that in the event of any inconsistency between NAFTA and a number of MEAs the provisions and obligations contained in the latter prevail provided that 'where a Party has a choice among equally effective and reasonably available means of complying with such obligations, the Party chooses the alternative that is the least inconsistent with the other provisions of this Agreement'. While this savings clause is often seen as a landmark event providing some credibility to the claim of NAFTA's environmental friendliness, I
would argue that for a regional FTA such a savings clause is not necessary. This is for two reasons: First, the likelihood of a trade restrictive measure taken in pursuance of a MEA becoming challenged is very small even at the WTO level with a much more diverse membership than amongst the partners to a regional FTA, where such conflicts can be solved more easily (Neumayer 2000a) . Second, and more importantly, if there is potential for conflict between MEA provisions and free trade obligations, then this conflict must also be solved at the multilateral, rather than regional, level. In other words, the potential for conflict needs to be solved at the WTO level. I would therefore argue that the MFTZ should not include a MEA savings clause.
A SANCTIONED ENFORCEMENT CLAUSE MAY BACKFIRE
Apart from the MEA savings clause, NAFTA or rather the North American These criticisms have some validity. However, I would argue here that the whole concept of threatening sanctions with regard to a failure to enforce environmental laws and regulations is fundamentally flawed, as it does not address the root cause of the failure, and may backfire, as policy makers might become deterred from enacting stringent environmental laws and regulations. On the first aspect, Neumayer (2001b) argues in great detail that the root cause of a failure to enforce environmental laws and regulations is likely to stem from political-institutional deficiencies rather than from a deliberate intent not to enforce. These deficiencies are not cured by threatening a country with sanctions for enforcement failure. Rather, what is needed is financial, technical and other assistance to help those countries in building enforcement capacity. On the second aspect, rational policy makers aware of deficiencies in their country's enforcement capacity will be deterred from enacting stringent laws and regulations if they have to fear that non-enforcement becomes punished. As more stringent laws and regulations are more difficult to enforce, there is a clear incentive to pass less stringent ones, which are easier to enforce. 
INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL ISSUES WITHIN A WIDER REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY
To leave member countries with substantial leeway in setting their own domestic level of environmental protection and to encourage the sustained improvement of environmental standards, represents an important part required to make the MFTZ an environmentally friendly FTA. Because the relationship between trade liberalisation and environmental harm is a very complex one (MCSD 2000) , member countries need to be free in setting the environmental standards they deem appropriate. Of at least equal importance, however, are provisions on institutional and financial matters that would foster regional cooperation within a wider environmental strategy.
Existing financial assistance to the Southern Mediterranean countries has been roundly criticised by environmentalists as too limited in general with too little being done for the environment in particular. The process has also been criticised as slow, non-transparent and too heavily focused on the bilateral instead of regional level (WWF 2000 , Wandel et al. 2000 .
With the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, the EU, to some extent in exchange for gaining duty free access for its industrial products over time, stepped up its financial aid to Southern Mediterranean countries. Between 1995 and 1999 some 900 million Euros were thus dedicated as part of the so-called MEDA programmes. impacts, all financial transactions should therefore become subject to comprehensive environmental impact assessment.
In order to make a real difference, the financial assistance in general and for environmental purposes in particular would also need to be increased substantially.
The World Bank (1995, pp. 70ff.) estimates that at least $58-78 bn would need to be invested over a period of ten years to promote more environmentally sustainable development in Southern Mediterranean countries. While some of these financial resources could come from introducing and raising charges and fees on domestic consumers of scarce natural resources, the great poverty of the vast majority of the population in these countries puts clear constraints on raising these resources domestically. More external financial, but also technical and other assistance, is therefore urgently needed to finance environmentally friendly projects and to build However, rather than creating a new environmental regime with new institutions, the existing regime would need to become restructured to allow for stronger integrative coordination and the mandate of existing institutions would need to become extended.
Whether this restructured environmental regime were to be part of the MFTZ agreement itself or would come in the form of an environmental side agreement, does not really matter. What matters is that the regime becomes better integrated with the prospective functions and operations of the MFTZ and that it can provide a platform on which regional environmental cooperation is based.
At the moment, there is just one article among the 100 or so typically contained in an association agreement that deals with matters of environmental cooperation.
Without exception, this article contains merely non-binding provisions. For example, Art. 48 of the agreement with Morocco states that 'the aim of cooperation shall be to prevent deterioriation of the environment, to improve the quality of the environment, to protect human health and to achieve rational use of natural resources for sustainable development'. The specific areas, for which environmental cooperation is promised, differ then from country to country. For example, while the agreements with Morocco and Tunisia merely mention soil and water quality, safety of industrial installations and waste as well as a monitoring and prevention of pollution of the sea, the agreement with the Palestinian Authority also places priority on matters relating to desertification, water resource management, salinization, environmental education and awareness and explicitly promises cooperation on the use of environmental tools such as environmental information systems (EIS) and environmental impact assessment (EIA). If regional environmental cooperation were to become a serious undertaking, then these rather rudimentary provisions would need to become integrated in a more comprehensive and binding framework. There would also need to be regular meetings 22 of the Environment Ministers from MFTZ countries to coordinate these cooperation efforts.
Furthermore, environmental issues would need to become integrated into other areas of cooperation as well, especially agriculture, coastal zone management, transport and energy, for which the already mentioned long-term oriented renewable energy partnership would hold great potential. The importance of this point must not be under-estimated. Experience from NAFTA shows that if environmental issues are merely treated separately instead of integrated into other issue negotiations, then the environment is likely to lose out in the end (Katz 1998) .
CONCLUSION
The year 2010, the deadline for the MFTZ to be in place, is still some time away. As mentioned, it does not currently seem to be a top priority for the EU to transform the bilateral negotiations into multilateral ones. Indeed, keeping the negotiations on a bilateral rather than multilateral level is somewhat convenient for the EU as this maintains a rather unequal balance of power in its favour. It will therefore depend to some extent on the Southern Mediterranean countries to press for multilateral negotiations for a MFTZ to begin.
It is not too early to start thinking about how the MFTZ could be turned into an environmentally friendly FTA. If the deadline of 2010 bears any meaning, then negotiations will have to start some time in the near future. It will be important that environmental concerns are imputed into the negotiating process right from the start.
It would be much more difficult to add them afterwards onto the negotiation outcomes and it would be next to impossible then to integrate environmental concerns into other policy areas.
If negotiators followed the blueprint outlined in this article, the MFTZ could become a green regional FTA. It would contain environmentally friendly preambular language and a comprehensive general exceptions clause, would aim for upward harmonisation of environmental standards, would give a prominent role to the precautionary principle and put the burden of proof on the party challenging an environmental measure. A MEA savings clause, on the other hand, is not necessary.
Also, while the MFTZ should contain uncomplicated provisions for investigating enforcement efforts by parties and should require them to give their citizens the opportunity to challenge non-enforcement before domestic courts, it should not threaten parties with sanctions for non-enforcement. Sanctions do not target the root causes of non-enforcement, which should be addressed via financial, technical and other assistance to help the Southern Mediterranean countries to enforce their own laws and regulations. Even if sanctions were desirable, it would be highly unlikely that they could become incorporated in a MFTZ as Southern Mediterranean might regard them as a non-acceptable encroachment into their sovereignty. More generally, it seems important in an attempt to design a green MFTZ not to overburden the agenda with items that do not seem to be strictly necessary. Developing countries are generally resistant towards efforts to green FTAs and one needs to take into account their sensitivities if one wants to succeed (Neumayer 2000d; 2001) . 3 The only way to overcome this resistance will be to make a green MFTZ also in the interest of Southern Mediterranean countries. Substantial financial and other assistance as part of a wider regional environmental strategy will be a precondition for making this happen.
